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Abstract
We model the decisions of young individuals to stay in school or drop-out
and engage in criminal activities. We build on the literature on human
capital and crime engagement and use the framework of Banerjee (1993)
that assumes that the information needed to engage in crime arrives in
the form of a rumor and that individuals update their beliefs about the
profitability of crime relative to education. These assumptions allow us to
study the effect of social interactions on crime. We first show that a society
with fully rational students is less vulnerable to crime than an otherwise
identical society with boundedly rational students. We also investigate the
spillovers from the actions of talented students to less talented students and
show that policies that decrease the cost of education for talented students
may increase the vulnerability of less talented students to crime. This is
always the case when the heterogeneity of students with respect to talent is
sufficiently small.
Keywords: human capital, the economics of rumors, social interactions,
urban economics.
JEL codes: D82, D83, I28
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1

Introduction

Many developing countries and poor areas in developed countries are plagued
by high crime rates and low levels of education. Young people seem to be
particularly vulnerable to crime engagement. Oftentimes, once crime has
started it spreads in an epidemiological way through a community. We here
suggest a theory of juvenile crime that is motivated by the idea that the
further people are from receiving a return on educational investments they
have made, and the more likely they are to be surrounded by other young
criminals, the more they will be willing to engage in crime. It allows us to
investigate the effect that educational policies have on the diffusion of crime
among young people.
Our theory is motivated by the fact that crime is a social phenomenon.
Following Becker (1968), economic theory sees crime as an occupational
choice or investment opportunity. A person compares the streams of payoffs
from crime versus other occupations or investments in human capital such as
going to school to obtain a good job later. Particularly interesting is Lochner
(2004) who builds a dynamic model of education and crime engagement and
explains the decreasing age-petty crime pattern. The more individuals have
invested in education, the larger the opportunity cost of crime. Hence,
older people who have accumulated more human capital or are closer to
graduation, will be less prone to engaging in crime.
There is evidence supporting the ideas of Becker and Lochner (see Levitt,
1998, Mocan and Rees, 2005). But there is also evidence showing that crime
engagement decisions are not completely described by the traditional neoclassical model and that a model with that aim should introduce new features. In particular, social interactions are important determinants of crime
engagement. Ludwig et al. (2001) and Kling et al. (2005) show that neighborhood’s wealth has an incidence in youth crimes. Particularly important
to our paper is the evidence found by Case and Katz (1991) who show that
in low-income Boston neighborhoods the behavior of peers appears to affect youth behaviors in a manner suggestive of contagion models. Another
important piece of evidence is provided by Luallen (2006) who shows that
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reducing school incapacitation increases crime rates among youngsters.
Taken together, the previous literature shows that the causal link between crime and low levels of human capital is quite complex. However,
there seems to be agreement that fostering education is a good way to fight
crime.
We investigate the interaction between educational policies and juvenile crime. We assume that everybody is rational, but that information on
the opportunity to become a criminal is not readily available. Rather it is
transmitted through an information diffusion process in society: people who
have become criminals meet students and students learn about the possibility to become a criminal rather than going to school. Our assumption
is in line with the evidence cited above. We investigate the nature of the
information transmission process between criminals and students and carry
out an investigation on the policies that reduce the cost of education such
as scholarships, meals or transport subsidies, better teachers and materials.
We consider social interactions using a model of a rumor process à la
Banerjee (1993). People are rational, they are young and go to school. Going
to school costs some effort or money. Some of the students are more talented,
thus they have lower costs, while others are less talented, and have higher
costs of going to school. Talent (or ability) is private information. There
is aggregate uncertainty: crime may pay or not and, because of differences
in the opportunity costs of crime engagement, the payoff of engaging in
crime depends on whether you are talented or not. Information on crime is
not common knowledge but travels as a rumor. Upon hearing the rumor, a
student updates the likelihood of crime being profitable and decides whether
to stay in school or become a criminal. The time that passes before a given
student meets a criminal for the first time provides crucial information about
the probability that crime is profitable. This is so because the speed of
the rumor transmission depends on the number of criminals, which in turn
depends on profitability of crime.
We show that there is a point in time after which talented students will
not be tempted anymore to become criminals. There is also a point in time
for the less talented, but it occurs later. Hence, the less talented are more
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vulnerable to crime engagement. Indeed if students are fully rational and
take into account the time passed before they hear the crime rumor, they
will be less likely to engage in crime. This holds for both the talented and
the less talented. Hence, social interaction need not increase crime, provided
that people understand the diffusion process. This can be seen as a rationale
for information campains about crime.
The second result is arguably more important for policy considerations.
We show that social interactions play a role in fully rational students’ decisions. The behavior of the talented students affects the behavior of the less
talented ones, but not the other way round. Consider a policy reducing the
cost of schooling for talented students (for instance, a meritocratic scholarship program). This policy directly reduces the vulnerability to crime
of talented students. To understand the effect on less talented students,
the way the rumor about crime spreads at any time afterwards is crucial.
Individuals update their beliefs of the profitability of crime by taking into
account the time that passes until they meet a criminal for the first time.
Older rumors are a signal that crime is less profitable; this is the effect that
appears in Banerjee (1993). However, there is a second effect that is caused
by the reduction in the number of talented students that become criminals.
We can show that this effect makes less talented students believe that crime
is more profitable. Consequently, a policy reducing the cost of education of
talented students may increase or decrease the vulnerability of less talented
students depending on the strength of each of the two effects. Moreover,
when the heterogeneity of students is sufficiently small, such a policy always
increases crime among less talented students.
The paper is related to a broader literature on information diffusion, such
as Banerjee (1992) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990), who develop models of
herd behavior. In those models information goes through a process of wordof-mouth learning and they are thought to explain financial runs, behavior
facing new products, etc. In the context of social economics, Jackson and
Yariv (2008) have recently reviewed the literature on the influence of social
networks on diffusion processes in different realms, such as disease contagion, technology adoption, vote decisions, etc. Previously, Akerlof (1997)
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developed a model that shows how social position may affect decisions such
as education attainment or childbearing. Economic models of social interactions and crime were firstly developed by Sah (1991) and Glaeser et al.
(1996). The former develops a model in which the decision of a person
to commit crime reduces the probability of other offenders to be arrested.
The latter develop a model in which the individuals decision about crime
depends on their neighbors’ decisions about criminal activities. The model
helps them to explain the cross-city variance of crime rates.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: in the next section, we
present our model and a benchmark. In the benchmark the probabilities
associated to the profitability of crime are exogenous. In our model this
is a result of assuming that students are boundedly rational - they do not
understand the rumor process. Alternatively, the same results are obtained
assuming that the information set available to students is more limited. We
maintain the bounded / full rationality terminology across the whole paper.
In the third section, we present our main results when we consider a society
conformed by fully rational students. In the fourth section, we analyze the
social interactions among student types and how this may affect education
policies. In the last section we conclude with some final remarks.

2

Model Setting

We consider population of students given by the interval [0, 1] with equal
life length T . We denote s the length of schooling of a student. After
graduation, students earn an income of W in each moment of the rest of
their lives. Education is costly; the instantaneous cost of education (in terms
of effort, tuition etc) is e. There are two types of students: a proportion q of
the students have high costs, e, and a proportion 1−q of the population have
low costs, e. Leaving problems of access to credit markets asides (a topic
that is beyond the scope of this paper), notice we can refer for simplicity to
high-cost students as “less talented” and low-cost students as “talented”.
To simplify the model, we assume that the discount rate is equal to zero
and that:

4
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Assumption 0 At t = 0 the entire population is attending school.
Education is a riskless project.1 Its value depends on the moment of life
of a person. At any moment in time t < s the instantaneous continuation
value of education is:
R (t) =

(T − s)W − (s − t) e
T −t

(1)

We have then R(t) and R(t) for e and e, respectively. The idea of R (t) is
that students must study a proportion s/T of life in order to obtain a degree
and to earn W in each moment of the rest of their lives. Students hence first
have to invest the cost of education to obtain its benefits afterwards. Clearly,
the value of education increases in t. The sunk-cost nature of education will
be a crucial feature in our model. We will simply refer to R(t) as the value
of education.
Assume for a first benchmark that becoming a criminal were a riskless
project with instantaneous returns a0 . Then if a0 < R(0) there is no crime.
If R(0) < a0 < R(0), the less talented (high-cost) students commit crime
during their entire life and talented (low-cost ) students commit no crime
and the total number of criminals is q. And, if R(0) < a0 , all students
commit crime during all life, in this case the total number of criminals is 1.
It makes much more sense, however, to consider that being a criminal is
a risky project. Consider that its returns are a with probability p, b with
probability r and d with probability 1 − p − r, where a > b > 0 > d.2
We make the following assumptions about the interaction between education, crime and different types of students:
Assumption 1 (T − s)W − se > 0
Assumption 2 pa + rb + (1 − p − r)d < 0
1
One can argue that education may also be a risky project. However, the existence
of institutions like minimum wages, that are common in both developed and developing
countries, make the education project less risky than the crime project. Moreover, in those
contexts in which education is riskier than crime, rumors about criminal projects may be
more pervasive. Hansen and Machin (2001) present empirical evidence showing that the
establishment of minimum wage actually causes a decrease in crime rates.
2
At the cost of further complication but without much benefit in terms of economic
insights one could assume that each of the states a, b and d were lotteries themselves, with
a the best lottery and d the worst.

5
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Assumption 3 W ≥ a
Assumption 4 R(0) < b < R(0) < a
Assumption 1 says that education pays for the less talented students
and hence also for the talented one. Assumption 2 is a somewhat stronger
assumption: it says that the ex ante expected value of crime is negative
such that without further information neither type of student would engage
in crime. It allows us to focus attention on crime due to social interaction.
Assumptions 3 and 4 are about the crime-education decisions during schooling time. Assumption 3 says that the riskless reward of education is larger
or equal to the largest payoff of crime. As a consequence, nobody becomes
a criminal after s, when all educational efforts are sunk. Assumption 4 says
that, at t = 0, crime is profitable for the talented type only if the true state
of the world is a. Crime is profitable for the less talented type if the true
state of the world is either a or b.
The previous assumptions deserve further discussion. Assumptions 1
and 2 together say that, ex-ante, education pays more than crime. This
is in line with previous evidence on gang earnings showing that risks of
criminal activities more than offset its wage premium with respect to legal
earnings (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000). Assumption 3 gathers the findings
of Lochner and Moretti (2004), that high school graduation significantly
reduces engagement in crime.3
At t = 0, all the population is attending school. A proportion x of the
population learns the true state of the world, which is either a, b or d. These
students then choose whether to drop out of school (and commit crime) or
to attend school (and exert effort).
Assumption 5 If the student commits crime once, he stays a criminal for
the rest of life, that is there is no way back to school once it has been interrupted.
From t = 0 on, each student meets another agent in each instant. The
agent may be either a criminal or a student. The student learns whether
3

This is so because wages after graduation are much higher than wages with no graduation.
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the agent is a criminal or not, but he does not learn the true state of the
world or the agent’s type (talented or less talented as a student). We will
let m denote the event in which the student effectively meets an individual
who had previously engaged in crime. When a student meets a criminal
for the first time, he can choose whether to commit crime or not. This
reflects the idea that crime is an occupational choice that becomes available
only through social interaction. In order to adopt crime, one needs to have
contact with other people who are criminals, because there are no formal
channels through which one can take this type of career.4 Upon meeting a
criminal, a student is then confronted with the choice of staying in school
or engaging in a very different type of career.
Assume now, for a second benchmark, that updating is boundedly rational in the following sense:
Assumption 6 A student who meets a criminal at time t updates his belief
about the state of the world, but he does not take into account the point of
time t = 0 at which the crime diffusion process has started.
Assumption 6 is meant to capture people’s limited knowledge or understanding of the diffusion process of crime. Assumption 6 implies that the
only information used by students to update their beliefs about the profitability of crime when they meet a criminal is the distribution of types of
students and the ex-ante distribution of the profitability of crime. Students
who have never met a criminal act as if nobody had committed crime, and
a student who meets a criminal at any time τ 0 > t assigns the same informational value to meeting a criminal as a student who meets the criminal
at time t.
Formally, suppose the true state of the world is either a or b (we do
not have to consider the true state of the world d because then nobody
commits crime). When a student meet a criminal he learns that crime may
be profitable for him and updates the probability of each state of the world.
4
We exclude that one can become a criminal without having any contact with other
criminals, as we are interested in crime, education and social interaction through information diffusion and not in the isolated decision of an individual to commit crime which
has been thoroughly studied by Becker and other scholars building on his work.

7
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Let π =

p
p+r

be the updated probability of state a. Students will commit

crime if and only if
ECbr ≡

π
π
a + (1 −
)b > R(t).
π + q(1 − π)
π + q(1 − π)

Result 1 Under boundedly rational updating,there is a time at which a student with cost of education e will not be tempted to adopt crime, but will
stay in school. This time is given by the function τbr (e) which follows:
τbr (e) =

T · ECbr + se − (T − s)W
.
ECbr + e

Let τ br = τbr (e) and τ br = τbr (e), we have that τ br < τ br .
This benchmark brings across the direct intuition from any extension of
a Becker-type model of crime. The lower the opportunity costs of crime,
the more likely people will adopt it. In our model, the opportunity cost
modeled explicitly is not the risk of being detected and punished (this is
contained in reduced form in the parameters a, b, d). Rather, we look at
the process through which education is acquired. Over time, education
becomes relatively less costly, because effort has already been sunk. Hence
the opportunity costs of crime increase over time, independently whether
one is talented or not. Further, the opportunity costs for the talented are
higher, which explains why their temptation to engage in crime ends earlier.

3

Fully Rational Students

We maintain Assumptions 1 to 5 and now assume that students take the
time dimension into account when updating:
Assumption 7 Students know the distribution of types and the date (t = 0)
in which the rumor started.
Under Assumption 7, the process of information transmission about
crime becomes a rumor process in the sense of Banerjee (1993). Criminals become a source of the rumor on crime and, thus, the probability of
hearing the rumor (meeting a criminal) increases with the number of criminals. Anybody’s decision whether or not to engage in crime thus creates
8
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information externalities. Under our assumptions, especially Assumptions 1
and 2, nobody will invest in crime unless somebody learns that someone else
has already committed crime. Rumor begins if the true state of the world is
either a or b. If a, a proportion x of people will become criminals at t = 0.
If b, a proportion qx will do so. If the true state is d, nobody will.
In our analysis there are three critical points in time for understanding
the decision of individuals regarding their education vs. crime decisions;
these are τ ∗ , τ and τ . The latter two are the moments in time when talented
and less talented students respectively stop engaging in crime; τ ∗ is the
moment in time at which less talented students would stop engaging in
crime if the probability of state a were zero. From equation (1) we obtain
τ ∗ equating R(τ ∗ ) to b; From Assumption 4, by continuity of R(t) we know
that τ ∗ > 0.
We now turn to determining τ and τ which requires some additional
notation. A talented student at any t or a less talented student at any
t > τ ∗ who meets a criminal will commit crime if:
EC(t) ≡ p(t)a + (1 − p(t))b > R(t).

(2)

where p(t) is the probability of the true state being a given that the student
meets a criminal for the first time at time t. It is estimated using Bayes’ rule:
π

p(t) =
π+
with π =

p
p+r .

P rob[m|b,t]
P rob[m|a,t] (1

− π)

P rob[m|s, t] is the probability that in state s ∈ {a, b} a

student meets a criminal for the first time at t. The ratio of P rob[m|b, t]
and P rob[m|a, t] determine p(t); this ratio will be crucial for our analysis
and we hence define it formally.
Definition 1 z(t) ≡

P rob[m|b,t]
P rob[m|a,t] .

We also define, z ∗ (t), the net gain of engaging in crime when it is profitable, relative to the net loss when it is not profitable:
Definition 2 z ∗ (t) ≡

π(a−R(t))
(1−π)(R(t)−b) .

9
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Because z ∗ (t) depends on the type of student which affects R(t):
z ∗ (t) ≡

π(a − R(t))
π(a − R(t))
and z ∗ (t) ≡
.
(1 − π)(R(t) − b)
(1 − π)(R(t) − b)

Notice also that z ∗ (t) is defined in the interval (τ ∗ , T ] while z ∗ (t) is defined
in [0, T ].
It can then readily be shown that inequality (2) holds for talented students if z(t) < z ∗ (t) and for less talented students if z(t) < z ∗ (t). This
analysis is summarized in the following result:
Result 2 Under fully rational updating, the behavior of students is as follows:
1. A less talented student who meets a criminal for the first time at t ≤ τ ∗
engages in crime.
2. A less talented students who meets a criminal for the first time at
t > τ ∗ , engages in crime if and only if z(t) ≤ z ∗ (t).
3. A talented student who meets a criminal for the first time, engages in
crime if and only if z(t) ≤ z ∗ (t).
We have shown that the crucial element in the decision to become a
criminal or not when hearing the rumor is the relative probability of meeting
a criminal in each of the two states of the world. Notice that the rumor on
crime only begins if the condition in Equation (2) holds at t = 0, that is, both
types must be vulnerable to crime at t = 0. The updating of fully rational
students uses the age of the rumor to calculate the number of criminals in
each state of the world. The decision rule stated in Result 2 identifies a
critical level for z(t) after which talented and less talented students keep on
going to school; the critical level depends on the costs that each individual
faces to complete school.
From Result 2, it becomes clear that both types of students are vulnerable to crime. Less talented students are more vulnerable than talented
students since they are likely to become criminals during a longer period of
life. To understand the dynamics of the diffusion process and, in the next
10
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step, the effect of different policies, we need to investigate the properties of
z(t), z ∗ (t) and z ∗ (t). Result 3 states the properties of z ∗ (t) and z ∗ (t).
Result 3 The functions z ∗ (t) and z ∗ (t) are both monotonically decreasing
in t and convex.
Proofs are in Appendix ??. According to Result 3 the profitability of
crime decreases with time for both types, in particular because the education
cost is continuously sunk at each moment of time. The result holds in the
respective domain of each function; that is, for z ∗ (t) in t ∈ [0, T ], and for
z ∗ (t) in t ∈ (τ ∗ , T ].
The analysis of z(t) is more challenging and it requires the use of additional notation and definitions. The following is borrowed from Banerjee
(1993).
Definition 3 For i = a, b, we define:
1. N (i, t) ≡ the proportion of the population that has committed crime
until time t in state i.
2. P (i, t) ≡ the proportion of the population that has not met a criminal
until time t in state i.
Using Definition 3 and the fact that
P rob[m|b, t] = N (b, t) P (b, t)
and
P rob[m|a, t] = N (a, t) P (a, t) ,
we can then write:
z(t) =

N (b, t) P (b, t)
.
N (a, t) P (a, t)

(3)

Notice that P (a, 0) = 1 − x, P (b, 0) = 1 − x, N (a, 0) = x, N (b, 0) = xq, and
that z(0) = q.
Definition 4 We distinguish between Regime 1, where z(t) ≤ z ∗ (t) and
Regime 2,where z(t) > z ∗ (t).

11
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We now show that there is a moment in time, which we call τ , in which
z(τ ) = z ∗ (τ ); i.e. a moment in time in which the system switches from
Regime 1 to Regime 2.
Notice that the process must start off in Regime 1 (i.e. the condition
in Equation 2 must hold at t = 0), otherwise, there will be no uncertainty
about crime. If the process began in Regime 2, everybody who meets a
criminal will know the criminal is a less talented student. Formally, the
process must start off when z(t) ≤ z ∗ (t), which at t = 0 boils down to
q≤

π (a − R (0))
.
(1 − π) (R (0) − b)

In Regime 1, the dynamics of N (i, t) and P (i, t) are given by
dP (i, t)
dt
dN (i, t)
dt

= −N (i, t) P (i, t) ,

(4)

= N (i, t) P (i, t) .

(5)

In Regime 2, the dynamics of N (i, t) and P (i, t) are given by
dP (i, t)
dt
dN (i, t)
dt

= −N (i, t) P (i, t) ,

(6)

= qN (i, t) P (i, t) .

(7)

The intuition for the difference is of course that in Regime 2 only less talented
students (a proportion q of the total population) may become criminals at
t > τ.
Furthermore, for an economy that has always been in Regime 1 holds:
P (a, t) = 1 − N (a, t) ,

(8)

P (b, t) = 1 − x (1 − q) − N (b, t) .

(9)

For an economy that has made its first transition to Regime 2 at moment τ
holds:
q [P (a, τ ) − P (a, t)] = N (a, t) − N (a, τ ) ,

(10)

q [P (b, τ ) − P (b, t)] = N (b, t) − N (b, τ ) .

(11)

Equations (8) and (9) evaluated in t = 0 together with equations (10) and
(11) evaluated in t = τ provide the initial conditions for the differential
12
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equations (4)-(7), respectively. These differential equations differs depending on the true state of the world. In both, Regime 1 and Regime 2, we
have that P (a, t) < P (b, t) and N (a, t) > N (b, t). This means that the proportion of individuals that engage in crime is higher in state a than in state
b; consequently, in a given t, the number of individuals that have not heard
the rumor is smaller in state a than in state b. With these things established
the following Result can readily be shown (see the formal proof in Banerjee,
1993).
Lemma 1 (The Banerjee effect) The ratio z(t) increases monotonically
in t and is unbounded.
The Lemma states that the older the rumor (i.e. the larger t), the
stronger the believe of students that the true state is b. The later a student
meets a criminal for the first time, he believes that it is more likely that the
benefits of crime are low.
From equations (4)-(11) one can see that since the dynamics in both
regimes differ, z(t) will have different forms in each regime. For t < τ , in
Regime 1, z(t) is defined by (4), (5), (8) and (9), we will let z r1 (t) represent
this part of z(t). For t ≥ τ , in Regime 2, z(t) is defined by (6), (7), (10) and
(11), we will let z r2 (t) represent this part of the function. z r1 depends on x
and q; z r2 depends on x, q and the parameters that determine z ∗ (since τ is
determined by the equality z ∗ = z r1 ,). Indeed τ defines the initial conditions
for (and determines the actual path followed by) z r2 . We can then define
formally the function z(t) as follows:
 r1
z (t), if t ≤ τ ;
z(t) =
z r2 (t), if t > τ .

(12)

Explicit expressions for z r1 (t) and z r2 (t) can be easily obtained using (3),
(4)-(11). For our analysis we will need the explicit expression for z r2 which
can be expressed in terms of P (i, τ ), N (i, τ ) and (t − τ ), as follows
z r2 =

dN (b,t)
dt
dN (a,t)
dt

=

qN (b, t) P (b, t)
=
qN (a, t) P (a, t)

dN (b,τ )
g(P (b, τ ), t − τ )
dt
dN (a,τ )
f (P (a, τ ), t − τ )
dt

(13)

The specific forms z r2 and z r1 appear in the Appendix 1 where it will be
clear that g and f are two specific functions.
13
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The following Lemma shows that τ exists.
Lemma 2 Provided that q ≤

π(a−R(0))
(1−π)(R(0)−b) ,

there will be an instant τ at

which there will be a transition from Regime 1 to Regime 2.
We have so far established that the beliefs on the true state of the world
converge to b (Lemma 1), that the value of education relative to crime is
increasing over time (Result 3), and that τ exists (Lemma 2). It is important
to note that the rumor on crime goes beyond τ . Consider a student who
meets a criminal in t > τ . Although he knows that talented students are
not vulnerable anymore, he also knows there are criminals who had been
talented students, but met a criminal before τ . At τ non talented students
are still vulnerable to crime.
Following a similar reasoning we can show how the less talented students
behave. Indeed, from Results 3 and 1 we have that z(t) − z ∗ (t) is monotonically increasing. Therefore there exists a τ such that z(τ ) = z ∗ (τ ). Since an
increasing amount of education cost is sunk over time, there is a moment in
time in which no student becomes a criminal anymore. After τ , education is
more valuable than crime for both types. The total number of criminals thus
reaches its maximum at τ . After τ , some students will still meet criminals
(who can be of either type) but they will not engage in crime. As we have
argued before, the time at which talented students stop engaging in crime,
τ , is strictly shorter than the time at which less talented students do so,
τ . In a nutshell, less talented students are more vulnerable to crime than
talented students since their cost of schooling is larger (se > se). Figure 1
depicts the solutions we presented above.
A comparison with the cutoff values for boundedly rational students
derived in the preceeding section establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A society with fully rational students will be less vulnerable
to crime then an otherwise identical society with boundedly rational students.
Since boundedly rational students do not fully understand the diffusion
process, they believe that z(t) = q for all t. The updating process of unboundedly rational students makes them believe that z(t) is increasing in t
14
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Figure 1: Students’ decisions
and everywhere above q. Since z ∗ (t) and z ∗ (t) are both decreasing in t, all
this implies that τ < τ br and τ < τ br .
There is one more characteristic of z(t) that we must consider, this is
stated in the following result.
Lemma 3 At t = τ , there is a downward kink in z(t), that is, for t very
near to τ , the slope of z(t) is larger for t ≤ τ than for t > τ .
There is a kink at τ because beyond this point, talented students who
have not yet met a criminal will never engage in crime. At the kink the
speed of the rumor decreases, which has important consequences for the
policy effects we present below.

4

Policy: the effect of changing the costs of education

In the previous section we have investigated how crime spreads in a society
and how it affects education. We here show that policies reducing the cost
of education may have surprising effects. Examples of such policies are
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Figure 2: Decisions of boundedly and fully rational students
reductions of tuition fees, food for school programmes, improvements in
school infrastructure or teachers. These measures can be given depending
on performance of a student, which makes them contingent on their type
(talented vs less talented).
Consider policies such that e, e or both are reduced. These reductions
have a direct effect on the vulnerability to crime of the targeted type of
student, but there is also an indirect effect through the transmission of
information about crime profitability among students of different types. The
direct effect of reducing e (e) shifts τ (τ ) to the left. That is, the point in
time at which no more students of a given type will engage in crime occurs
earlier when their cost of attending and succeeding at school decreases. Put
differently, students become less vulnerable to crime.
The indirect interaction, i.e. effects between different types, are much
more subtle, but they only go from talented students to less talented students. To understand this statement notice first that both the talented and
the less talented students carry out the same type of comparison between
costs and benefits of engaging in crime. More precisely, they both have the
same uncertain benefit of engaging in crime and they assign the same probability distribution to the states a, b, d. Also, wages upon graduation are
assumed to be the same for both types. The opportunity costs of engaging
in crime, however, are type-dependent: talented students have lower costs
of going to school than less talented ones, which explains why τ is to the
16
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left of τ .
For any t smaller than τ , any change in the parameters affects equally
the expected benefits both types of students assign to crime. This implies
that among criminals, the proportion of talented and less talented types
is constant, reflecting the respective proportions in the entire population.
There are interaction effects here, but they do not depend on the types. This
changes at t = τ . Here, no further talented student engages in crime, while
less talented students who meet a criminal continue to do so, implying that
the proportion of less talented types among criminals increases. Hence, when
one wants to understand the interaction effects between different types, it
suffices to investigate how a shift in τ will affect the behavior of less talented
students. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Effects of a decrease in e (the costs of education for talented
students): (i) τ shifts to the left i.e. talented students become less vulnerable
to crime; (ii) the effect of a reduction in e on τ is ambiguous, in particular
a reduction of e may result in an increase of τ i.e., less talented students
may become more vulnerable to crime.
To understand the second part of the proposition recall that students
vulnerability to crime depends on z(t) in particular, if z(t) increases because
of an intervention, students become less vulnerable, and if z(t) decreases they
become more vulnerable.
The introduction of a subsidy scheme for more talented students will
cause an instantaneous reduction of the number of criminals in both state of
the world, because the subsidy makes the talented students less vulnerable
to crime. If a student meets a criminal at a given t he will have stronger
beliefs about the true state of the world being a if the subsidy scheme is in
place. To formally see this effect consider two situations, one without the
subsidy and one with the subsidy; let τ 0 and τ 0 be the two moments in time
in which talented and less talented students stop engaging in crime with
out the subsidy and τ 00 and τ 00 with the subsidy. We know from Lemma 3
that at the moment in time in which talented students are not vulnerable to
crime any more, there is a kink in z(t) this implies that at τ 00 the slope to
17
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the right of z(t) with and without a subsidy is different. Without a subsidy
the right derivative of function z(t) at τ 00 is equal to
z τ 00





2 P b, τ 00 − P a, τ 00 + x (1 − q) .

When there is a subsidy, the right derivative of z(t) at τ 00 is
z τ 00





(1 + q) P b, τ 00 − P a, τ 00 + x (1 − q)

which is smaller than the previous one. This means that the introduction
of a subsidy scheme makes state a more likely at τ 00 .
From τ 00 onwards this effect coexists with the Banerjee effect (Lemma 1),
which makes the beliefs about b being the true state of the world increase
with time. The two effect hence go in opposite directions.
Another way to formally see these two effects is by looking at the derivative of z(t) in Regime 2, that is after the time talented students cease to be
vulnerable to crime, with respect to τ . Deriving the function z r2 in Equation
(13) we obtain
∂z r2
∂t
z r2



=

∂

∂N (b,t)
∂t

∂t
∂N (b,t)
∂t

∂

−

∂N (a,t)
∂t

∂t
∂N (a,t)
∂t


+





∂g ∂P (b,t)
 ∂P (b,t) ∂t

−

∂g
∂(t−t)

g(P (b, t), t − t)

−

∂P (a,t)
∂f
∂t
∂P (a,t)

−



∂f
∂(t−t) 

f (P (a, t), t − t)

.

The first term in on the right-hand side corresponds to the subsidy effect
that increases the belief of state a being the true state of the world. The
second term gathers the interaction of the first effect with the Banerjee effect
in each state of the world. Notice that the size of the interaction depends
on t. Less talented students will become more (less) vulnerable to crime if
at t = t the first effect is stronger (weaker) than the second effect.
Two different systems that differ in e only differ in their dynamics after
the lower τ . The differences are consequence of changing the initial conditions for z r2 and on changes in the dynamics of z(t) after τ . Precisely, what
one wants to know is whether, for t > τ , z 00 is to the left or to the right of z 0
or whether they cross. If they cross one also wants to know if z 00 crosses z 0
18
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from above or from below. If z 00 is to the right (left) of z 0 this would mean
that reducing the cost of talented students increases (reduces) the vulnerability of less talented students. In other words if z 00 is to the right (left)
of z 0 a reduction in e would bring the undesirable effect of increasing τ ; in
the other case reducing e would have a positive externality since it would
also reduce τ . A full comparison of z 0 (t) and z 00 (t) is in general not possible.
However, the following example shows that for two sets of parameters in
which the only difference is the value of a, a change in e of the same size
induces changes in t of different signs.
Example 1 Consider the following values for the parameters of our model:
x = 0.1, q = 0.6, τ = 10, W = 69, a = 55, b = 15, π = 0.6 and T = 34. The
effort of the less talented students is e = 153 and the effort of the talented
students is e = 100. With this information, all less talented students that
hear the rumor about crime before τ ≈ 5.44 choose to become criminals.
Similarly, all talented students that hear the rumor before τ ≈ 4.07 will do
so. Let us consider a policy that reduces the costly effort of education for
talented students. It reduces e to 35. This policy reduces the vulnerability
to crime of talented students to 1.58 and makes less talented students more
vulnerable to crime increasing τ to 5.51. This example is depicted in Figure
3.
Now, consider an alternative situation in which crime pays more, such
that a = 64 . In this case the initial τ is 5.39; the initial τ is 5.96. When
the policy that reduces e from 100 to 35 is implemented, the vulnerability
of talented students decreases to 2.68 but less talented students become less
vulnerable to crime; τ decreases from 5.96 to 5.93. The example is in figure
4.
The next proposition identifies a sufficient condition under which there
is no ambiguity.
Proposition 3 Comparative statics with respect to student heterogeneity
(e − e). For sufficiently low levels of student heterogeneity, a decrease in
the cost of education of talented students makes less talented students more
vulnerable to crime.
19
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Figure 3: Example of policy that reduces vulnerability of talented students
but increases vulnerability of less talented students

Figure 4: Example of policy that reduces vulnerability of talented and less
talented students
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Proof. Consider a situation in which e − e is small. Consequently τ − τ
is also small. Consider two levels of cost of education for talented students
e0 and e00 , such that e0 > e00 . The corresponding moments in time in which
talented students stop engaging in crime are τ 0 and τ 00 , and they satisfy
τ 0 > τ 00 . We also have two functions for z(t); let these functions be z 0 (t)
and z 00 (t). These two functions are exactly the same for any t ≤ τ 00 and
differ for t > τ 00 . Consider a t such that τ 0 > t > τ 00 . Since τ 0 > t > τ 00 ,
t belongs to Regime 1 when e = e0 and to Regime 2 in the second case.
From Lemma 3, we have that there is downward kink at τ . Therefore, since
functions z(t), z ∗ (t) and z ∗ (t) are continuous, for t near enough to τ 00 we
have that z 0 (t) > z 00 (t) for t > τ 0 . Since τ 0 is near τ 0 , τ 00 is near τ 00 and z ∗ (t)
is downward sloping we then have that τ 0 < τ 00 .

5

Concluding remarks

We have suggested a theory of education and crime of young individuals. Information needed to engage in crime is not available to everybody; to become
a criminal an individual has to hear information that affects the profitability of crime from someone who is already a criminal. Crime thus spreads
in an epidemic fashion, as in the literature on rumors. We have shown that
social interactions among fully rational students reduce crime engagement.
Second, we have studied how informational externalities between different
types of individuals affect crime engagement. The informational externality
is such that policies aiming to decrease the costs of education of talented students have effects also on the education success and on crime engagement of
less talented students. In particular, they may increase the vulnerability of
less talented students to crime, which is always the case when heterogeneity
of students with respect to talent is sufficiently low.

21

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

23

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 517 [2010]

Appendix
The form of z r1 and of z r2

A

The forms z r1 is
z r1 =
where

dN (b,t)
dt
dN (a,t)
dt

dN (b, t)
(1 − x) (1 − x (1 − q))2 xqe(1−x(1−q))t
=
2
dt
1 − x + xqe(1−x(1−q))t

and

dN (a, t)
x (1 − x) et
.
=
dt
(1 − x + xet )2

The form of z r2 is
z r2 =
where

dN (b,τ )
g(P (b, τ ), t − τ )
dt
dN (a,τ )
f (P (a, τ ), t − τ )
dt

dN (b, τ )
q (1 − x) (1 − x (1 − q))2 xqe(1−x(1−q))τ
=
,
2
dt
1 − x + xqe(1−x(1−q))τ
dN (a, τ )
qx (1 − x) eτ
,
=
dt
(1 − x + xeτ )2

(1 − x(1 − q) − (1 − q)P (b, τ ))2 e(1−x(1−q)−(1−q)P (b,τ ))(t−τ )
g(P (b, τ ), t−τ ) = 
2
qP (b, τ ) + (1 − x(1 − q) − P (b, τ ))e(1−x(1−q)−(1−q)P (b,t))(t−τ )
and
(1 − (1 − q)P (a, τ ))2 e(1−(1−q)P (a,τ ))(t−τ )
f (P (a, τ ), t − τ ) = 
2 .
qP (a, τ ) + (1 − P (a, τ ))e(1−(1−q)P (a,τ ))(t−τ )

B

Proofs
1. Proof of Result 3:
Since z ∗ (t) is continuous and differentiable then to show the result it
is enough to to analyze the signs of the first two derivatives of z ∗ (t).
We first need to know that

R0 (t) =

R (t) + e
> 0,
1−t

22

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper517

24

Cortés et al.: Crime and Education in a Model of Information Transmission

R00 (t) = 2

R0 (t)
> 0.
(1 − t)

Taking the first derivative of z ∗ (t), we obtain that


π
R0 (t)
+ z ∗ (t) < 0.
z ∗0 (t) = −
(R (t) − b) 1 − π
Taking the second derivative
z ∗00 (t) =



#
2
" 
00 (t)
0 (t)
π
R
R
−
> 0.
+ z ∗ (t) 2
1−π
(R (t) − b)
(R (t) − b)

2. Proof of Lemma 2:
Since q ≤

π(a−R(0))
(1−π)(R(0)−b) ,

the rumor on crime starts off. Let us first

consider the case of strict inequality. Once a talented student meets
a criminal, he updates beliefs on the state of the world and takes
decisions following the rule in Result 2. Since, z(0) < z ∗ (0), the crime
is profitable for talented students. Those students meeting criminals
at t = 0 will become criminals. This will be the behavior of talented
students for all t > 0 provided that z(t) < z ∗ (t). From Result 3,
z ∗ (t) is monotonically decreasing with time and from Result 1, z(t) is
monotonically increasing with time. Therefore, the difference z(t) −
z ∗ (t) monotonically increases with time. At t = 0, it is negative, then
it becomes zero and finally it becomes positive. Let τ be the moment
in time at which z(τ ) − z ∗ (τ ) = 0. For all t > τ the talented student
that meets a criminal will stay in school. At τ there will be a transition
from Regime 1 and Regime 2. Now let us consider the case of strict
equality. In this case the talented students that know the true state
of the world are indifferent between staying at school and becoming
criminals. Those talented students that hear the rumor at t = 0 are
also indifferent between school and crime. However, since z(t) − z ∗ (t)
is monotonically increasing, all talented students that hear the rumor
at all t > 0 will stay at school. In this case, τ = 0.
3. Proof of Proposition 1:
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The idea of the proof is to compare the moment in time at which both
types of students stop to become criminals under two models: one
with time-independent updating (τ br and τ br ), the other with timedependent updating (τ and τ ). We need to show that τ br > τ and
τ br > τ .
On the one hand, with time-independent updating we have that
τ br =

T · ECbr + se − (T − s)W
T · ECbr + se − (T − s)W
and τ br =
.
ECbr + e
ECbr + e

On the other hand, with time-dependent updating we have that
τ=

T · EC(t) + se − (T − s)W
T · EC(t) + se − (T − s)W
and τ =
.
EC(t) + e
EC(t) + e

We also have that at t = 0, z(0) = q. Therefore ECbr = EC(0).
Finally,
∂τ ∂EC(t)
∂τ
=
,
∂z(t)
∂EC(t) ∂z(t)
∂τ
(T − s)(e + W )
=
>0
∂EC(t)
(EC(t) + e)2
and
∂EC(t)
< 0.
∂z(t)
Then
∂τ
< 0.
∂z(t)
Since
T · ECbr + se − (T − s)W
T · EC(0) + se − (T − s)W
=
ECbr + e
EC(0) + e
and from Lemma 1, z(t) is always increasing.then, τ br > τ for all t > 0.
Following the same procedure we obtain that τ br > τ .
4. Proof of Lemma 3:
To show that there is a downward kink at τ , we have to show that
−

+

t→τ

t→τ

lim z 0 (t) > lim z 0 (t) .
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Indeed,
−

−

lim z 0 (t) = lim [z (t) [2 (P (b, t) − P (a, t)) + x (1 − q)]]

t→τ

t→τ

= z (τ ) [2 (P (b, τ ) − P (a, τ )) + x (1 − q)]
and

+

+

t→τ

t→τ

lim z 0 (t) = lim z (t) [2q (P (b, t) − P (a, t))
+ (1 − q) (P (b, τ ) − P (a, τ )) + x (1 − q)]
= z (τ ) [(1 + q) (P (b, τ ) − P (a, τ )) + x (1 − q)]

Since 1, P (b, τ ) > P (a, τ ) and 2 > 1 + q, then there is a downward
kink in τ .
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